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Research on the Decision-Making Behavior of Stakeholders of Football Policy Implementation Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory(PDF)

南京师范大学学报（工程技术版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

Issue:
2024年02期
Page:
78-86
Research Field:
管理科学与工程
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Research on the Decision-Making Behavior of Stakeholders of Football Policy Implementation Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory
Author(s):
Hu Yonggang1; 2; Yang Chengwei1; 2
(1.Physical Education of Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101,China)
(2.Compus Football Development Research Center of West China,Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101,China)
Keywords:
school football policy; stakeholder; decision-making behavior; revolutionary game theory
PACS:
G80
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2024.02.010
Abstract:
The implementation of school football policy involves many stakeholders,and balancing the interests of all parties is the key to effective policy implementation. To this end,this research constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model involving local football offices,schools,and parents based on the stakeholder analysis. Matlab is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary paths and the decision-making behaviors of the three parties. The results show that:local school football association,school,parents tripartite probabilities of initial strategy interact with each other. Different probability values have a differentiated impact for the rate of tripartite main part converging to the ideal condition. The choices of initial strategies interplay among the three parties,and when the initial probability of the three parties reaches a high level,the dynamic system is more likely to reach an ideally stable state. The revenue of the local school football office has a positive effect on the system convergence to the ideal state,and the higher the revenue,the faster the system converges to the ideally stable state. In order to promote the three parties’ strategic choice to converge to the equilibrium state of interests,policy suggestions are made in terms of promoting the recognition of the value and the willingness of the three parties to participate,establishing an interest expression mechanism and reducing information asymmetry,and improving the implementation assessment mechanism and as well as the supervision and evaluation system.

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Last Update: 2024-06-15