[1]胡用岗,杨成伟.校园足球政策执行利益主体决策行为的演化博弈研究[J].南京师范大学学报(工程技术版),2024,24(02):078-86.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2024.02.010]
　Hu Yonggang,Yang Chengwei.Research on the Decision-Making Behavior of Stakeholders of Football Policy Implementation Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Engineering and Technology),2024,24(02):078-86.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2024.02.010]
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校园足球政策执行利益主体决策行为的演化博弈研究
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南京师范大学学报（工程技术版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
24卷
期数:
2024年02期
页码:
078-86
栏目:
管理科学与工程
出版日期:
2024-06-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
Research on the Decision-Making Behavior of Stakeholders of Football Policy Implementation Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory
文章编号:
1672-1292(2024)02-0078-09
作者:
胡用岗1; 2; 杨成伟1; 2
(1.四川师范大学体育学院,四川 成都 610101)
(2.四川师范大学西部校园足球发展研究中心,四川 成都 610101)
Author(s):
Hu Yonggang1; 2; Yang Chengwei1; 2
(1.Physical Education of Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101,China)
(2.Compus Football Development Research Center of West China,Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101,China)
关键词:
校园足球政策; 利益主体; 决策行为; 演化博弈
Keywords:
school football policy; stakeholder; decision-making behavior; revolutionary game theory
分类号:
G80
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2024.02.010
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
校园足球政策执行涉及利益主体众多,均衡各方主体利益是校园足球政策有效执行的关键所在. 从利益视角出发,构建地方校足办、学校和家长三方利益主体的动态演化博弈模型,以Matlab为工具仿真分析三方主体决策行为的演化路径和演化规律. 结果表明:地方校足办、学校、家长三方初始策略概率相互影响,不同概率取值对三方主体向理想状态收敛速度产生差异化影响,当三方达到较高水平的初始概率时,动态系统更易达到理想稳定状态; 地方校足办的收益水平对系统趋于理想状态具有正向作用,收益越高,系统收敛于理想稳定状态的速度越快. 为促使三方策略选择趋向利益均衡状态,从加大理念价值传播、提高三方参与意愿、建立利益表达机制、降低信息不对称程度、完善执行考核机制、构建监督评价体系等方面提出相应的政策建议.
Abstract:
The implementation of school football policy involves many stakeholders,and balancing the interests of all parties is the key to effective policy implementation. To this end,this research constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model involving local football offices,schools,and parents based on the stakeholder analysis. Matlab is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary paths and the decision-making behaviors of the three parties. The results show that:local school football association,school,parents tripartite probabilities of initial strategy interact with each other. Different probability values have a differentiated impact for the rate of tripartite main part converging to the ideal condition. The choices of initial strategies interplay among the three parties,and when the initial probability of the three parties reaches a high level,the dynamic system is more likely to reach an ideally stable state. The revenue of the local school football office has a positive effect on the system convergence to the ideal state,and the higher the revenue,the faster the system converges to the ideally stable state. In order to promote the three parties’ strategic choice to converge to the equilibrium state of interests,policy suggestions are made in terms of promoting the recognition of the value and the willingness of the three parties to participate,establishing an interest expression mechanism and reducing information asymmetry,and improving the implementation assessment mechanism and as well as the supervision and evaluation system.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2024-01-22.
基金项目:2020年教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(20YJC890008).
通讯作者:胡用岗,副教授,研究方向:校园足球、学校体育.E-mail:249251025@qq.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2024-06-15