[1]陈 玙,钱 钢,沈玲玲.考虑消费者环境偏好和制造商风险规避的定价策略分析[J].南京师范大学学报(工程技术版),2017,17(02):087.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2017.02.014]
 Chen Yu,Qian Gang,Shen Lingling.Pricing Strategy Analysis Considering ConsumerEnvironmental Preference and Risk Aversion[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Engineering and Technology),2017,17(02):087.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2017.02.014]
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考虑消费者环境偏好和制造商风险规避的定价策略分析
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南京师范大学学报(工程技术版)[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
17卷
期数:
2017年02期
页码:
087
栏目:
金融工程
出版日期:
2017-06-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Pricing Strategy Analysis Considering ConsumerEnvironmental Preference and Risk Aversion
文章编号:
1672-1292(2017)02-0087-06
作者:
陈 玙1钱 钢1沈玲玲12
(1.南京师范大学计算机科学与技术学院,江苏 南京 210023)(2.南京师范大学商学院,江苏 南京 210023)
Author(s):
Chen Yu1Qian Gang1Shen Lingling12
(1.School of Computer Science and Technology,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)(2.Business School,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)
关键词:
环境偏好风险规避政府补贴绿色供应链博弈
Keywords:
environmental preferencerisk aversiongovernment subsidiesgreen supply chaingame analysis
分类号:
C939
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1672-1292.2017.02.014
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
近年来环境问题已成为人们需要迫切解决的问题,如何鼓励制造商生产高绿色度产品也成为各国面临的一大难题. 本文以生产不同绿色度产品的制造商之间的博弈为背景,考虑消费者的环境偏好、制造商的风险规避、产品绿色度以及政府补贴等因素,建立双寡头垄断的Cournot静态博弈模型,并利用均值-方差理论,确定各制造商的最优价格. 最后进行数值仿真,探讨消费者环境偏好和制造商的风险规避对产品价格的影响. 结果表明:在其他条件不变的情况下,消费者的环境偏好增加、政府补贴增长以及生产商的风险规避度升高都能导致产品价格降低,产品价格的降低可以促使企业提升产品的绿色度. 这些结论可以为制造商生产决策提供参考价值和指导意义.
Abstract:
Recently,the environment has become an urgent problem. How to encourage manufacturers to produce high green products is a major problem faced by all countries. We propose the Cournot game model in duopoly,and find every manufacturer’s optimal pricing decision by using the mean variance theory against the background of game analysis between manufacturers with different product greenness,considering consumer environmental preference,the degree of manufacturer risk aversion,product greenness and government’s subsidies. Finally,the numerical simulation is conducted to discuss the effect of consumer environmental preference and manufacturer risk aversion. Results show that,when the other factors are constants,the price will decrease as the consumer environmental preference,manufacturer risk aversion and government subsidies increased. The lowering of the price can improve greenness of the products. All of these conclusions provide a reference and guiding for the manufacturers to make the final decision.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-11-21.
通讯联系人:沈玲玲,博士研究生,讲师,研究方向:管理科学与工程. E-mail:llshen5099@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-06-30