[1]金霁.加工时间是开工时间线性函数的两人合作排序博弈问题[J].南京师范大学学报(工程技术版),2012,12(04):087-92.
　Jin Ji.Two Cooperative Game Problem on Scheduling With Linear Processing Time of Its Starting Time[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Engineering and Technology),2012,12(04):087-92.
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加工时间是开工时间线性函数的两人合作排序博弈问题
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南京师范大学学报（工程技术版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
12卷
期数:
2012年04期
页码:
087-92
栏目:
出版日期:
2012-12-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Two Cooperative Game Problem on Scheduling With Linear Processing Time of Its Starting Time
作者:
金霁
苏州市职业大学基础部，江苏苏州215104
Author(s):
Jin Ji
Foundation Department,Suzhou Vocational University,Suzhou 215104,China
关键词:
排序; 博弈; 合作; 收益; 最大流程时间; 线性函数
Keywords:
scheduling;  game;  cooperation; profit; maximum flow time;  linear function
分类号:
O225
摘要:
现实活动中,存在大量的需要由多人合作才能完成某项工作的情况.针对两人合作共同加工一批工件,每人有一台加工机器,每个工件只需加工一次,工件加工时间是开工时间的线性函数的问题建立数学模型,考虑以最小的最大流程时间作为加工成本,确定这批工件的一个划分,把工件分配给两台机器加工.该划分方案不仅考虑到合作双方的效率,而且充分体现公平性原则,从而使双方对相应的合作(加工)收益分配满意,愿意合作.
Abstract:
In the real world， there exist many situation where many persons need cooperate in order to complete a project． We establish a mathematical model of the problem where two persons process a batch of jobs by cooperation． Each person offers a single machine and each job with linear processing time of its starting time just needs to be processed once． If we define the minimized maximum flow time as a processing cost，determine a division of these jobs which not only considers the efficiency of each person but also embodies the fairness principle， to yield a reasonable cooperative( processing) profit allocation scheme acceptable to them．

参考文献/References:

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［6］ Gu Y H，Fan J，Tang G C， et al． Maximum latency scheduling problem on two-person cooperative games［J /OL］． Journal of Combinatorial Optimization，( 2011－11－16) ［2012－04－18］． http: / /www． springerlink． com/content /6mm57855x5598kv8 / fulltext． pdf．
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［8］ 金霁，顾燕红，唐国春． 最大完工时间排序的两人合作博弈［J］． 上海第二工业大学学报， 2011， 28( 1) : 14-17． Jin Ji，Gu Yanhong，Tang Guochun． Two-person cooperative games on makespan scheduling［J］． Journal of Shanghai Second Polytechnic University， 2011， 28( 1) : 14-17． ( in Chinese)
［9］ 顾燕红，金霁，唐国春． 加工时间可变最大流程时间排序的纳什合作博弈［J］． 重庆师范大学学报: 自然科学版， 2012， 29 ( 4) : 18-23． Gu Yanhong， Jin Ji，Tang Guochun． Nash bargaining on maximum flow time scheduling with changeable processing time［J］． Journal of Chongqing Normal University: Natural Science Edition， 2012， 29( 4) : 18-23． ( in Chinese)
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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目:苏州市职业大学青年基金资助项目( 2011SZDQ05) ．
通讯联系人:金霁，讲师，研究方向: 排序论． E-mail: szjinji@126． Com
更新日期/Last Update: 2013-03-21